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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3833 
_____________ 
 
LAWRENCE FISHER 
 
 v. 
 
 WARDEN SOMERSET SCI, 
    Appellant  
____________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 3-06-cv-00220) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
_____________________ 
 
Argued:  September 10, 2014 
______________________ 
 
Before:  SMITH, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 5, 2014) 
________________________ 
 
OPINION
*
 
________________________ 
 
Lisa B. Freeland [ARGUED] 
Office of the Federal Public Defender 
1001 Liberty Avenue 
1500 Liberty Center 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
                                            
*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting Lawrence Fisher’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and requiring the 
Commonwealth to retry Fisher for the murder of Dwayne Hudgins within 180 days or 
release him.  The District Court concluded that the Commonwealth committed a Brady
†
 
violation by suppressing information about an agreement between prosecutors and a 
witness who testified against Fisher.  Because the District Court did not consider the 
nature and timing of any such agreement, we will vacate the order and remand for further 
proceedings. 
I 
 Hudgins was shot in Homestead Borough, Pennsylvania on January 29, 1995, 
while driving a car in which Richard Epps and Epps’s cousins, Raheem and Artice 
Anderson, were riding.  On the day of the shooting, police interviewed Epps.  Epps told 
police that a passenger in a car driven by James Dorsey shot at Hudgins’s car.  Epps told 
police he knew Dorsey and had seen the passenger before but he did not know his name.  
                                            
 † Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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Fisher v. Rozum, No. 3:06-cv-220 (W.D. Pa. ) (“Fisher”) ECF No. 2 at 23 (Epps stating 
that the shooter was a black male who he had seen before but that he did not know his 
name).  The next day, Epps picked Fisher out of a photo array.  Two months later, police 
arrested Fisher, who told police that while he did not shoot Hudgins, he knew who did.  
He then invoked his right to remain silent.   
 On April 13, 1995, Epps testified at a coroner’s inquest.  He explained that, before 
the shooting, Artice Anderson had threatened Fisher with a gun.  According to Epps, 
about fifteen minutes later, Hudgins, Epps, and the Andersons were seated in Hudgins’s 
car when they saw Dorsey’s car approach with an individual in the passenger seat 
pointing a gun at Hudgins’s car.  Fisher, ECF No. 29-9 at 8-14.  Hudgins attempted to get 
away from Dorsey’s car, but a bullet entered through the back windshield of Hudgins’s 
car, striking Hudgins in the back of the head and killing him, after which the car crashed.   
Epps said that he jumped from the car, exclaimed that a man was shot, and called for 
help.  He also testified that police showed him photographs, he identified the photograph 
of Fisher as depicting the shooter, and he had “[n]o doubt” Fisher fired the shots at 
Hudgins’s car.  Id. at 19.
‡
   
 Approximately two weeks before Fisher’s trial for Hudgins’s murder, Epps, 
without a plea agreement, entered a guilty plea to drug charges that were filed against 
him in November 1994.  Fisher, ECF No. 29-1.  While the information concerning Epps’s 
                                            
 ‡On the same day, police interviewed Artice Anderson, who told them that Fisher had brandished a gun in a 
threatening way, that he saw Fisher sitting on the passenger side of Dorsey’s car, but that he could not see who was 
shooting at them.     
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criminal history was disclosed to Fisher’s counsel before trial, the guilty plea apparently 
was not.
§
     
 At Fisher’s trial, Epps again testified about the shooting, including that he 
remained at the scene, called for help, told police he recognized the shooter but did not 
then know his name, and identified a photograph of Fisher as depicting the shooter.  On 
cross-examination, Fisher attempted to impeach Epps by pointing to several purported 
inconsistencies between Epps’s statements to police, at the coroner’s inquest, and at trial.  
For instance, Fisher asked Epps whether he told police that he did not know who the 
shooter was, but Epps responded that he could identify the shooter yet did not know him 
by name.  Fisher also highlighted that Epps initially failed to disclose to police that Artice 
Anderson was carrying a gun on the day of the shooting.  There were also some 
inconsistencies between Epps’s inquest and trial testimony.  For instance, Epps testified 
at the inquest that he did not recall what Fisher was wearing besides a hat, Fisher, ECF 
No. 29-9 at 28, 29, 35.  At trial, in contrast, he stated that Fisher was wearing a hooded 
sweatshirt without the hood up and that he could not recall whether Fisher was wearing a 
hat.  Fisher attempted to impeach Epps with his prior criminal history, to which Epps 
acknowledged he “had a lot of cases,” including a conviction for receiving stolen 
property.  App. 106.   
 Raheem Anderson also testified at Fisher’s trial.  His testimony was generally 
                                            
 § Although Fisher argues that the failure to disclose the fact Epps entered a plea to the drug charges before 
trial violated Brady, the core of his argument, and the concern of the Fisher I panel, has been that there may have 
been some sort of promise of leniency in exchange for Epps’s testimony at Fisher’s trial.  The record, however, 
shows that Epps entered the plea to all pending charges with no plea agreement and the fact alone that he pleaded 
guilty would not show that an agreement of the sort about which the Fisher I panel was concerned existed.  For the 
reasons set forth herein, the absence of information on this subject further supports our decision to remand. 
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consistent with Epps’s testimony concerning the incident: he stated that he saw Fisher in 
Dorsey’s car and that Fisher shot at Hudgins’s car.  Raheem Anderson also testified that 
Fisher had threatened to kill Artice Anderson
**
 three days before Hudgins was killed.    
Raheem Anderson was unclear on Fisher’s name and nickname, however, and admitted 
on cross-examination that he did not actually see Dorsey driving the car during the 
shooting.  He further indicated that he had been more certain in his statements to police 
than he really felt because the interviewing officers were “[p]utting wood to the fire.” 
App. 162-63. 
 Carl Sullivan, who had been housed with Dorsey at the Allegheny County Prison 
in February 1995, also testified.  He said Dorsey told him that Dorsey admitted chasing 
Hudgins’s car and that he wanted to kill Epps before he could testify.  Sullivan did not 
testify about Fisher.   
 Fisher offered an alibi defense.  His mother and brother both testified that he had 
been home at the time of the shooting.    
 The jury returned a guilty verdict after brief deliberation and Fisher was sentenced 
to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.  He appealed his conviction to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed, and filed a petition for allowance of appeal 
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied.  On August 2, 1999, he filed a 
petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).  The state trial 
                                            
 **Artice Anderson invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, did not testify at trial, and recanted his prior 
statements.   
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court denied relief, the Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied allowance of appeal.   
 On October 11, 2006, Fisher filed a pro se petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.    
The District Court appointed the Federal Public Defender to represent him, and on May 
24, 2007, he filed an amended petition.  Fisher’s amended petition alleged for the first 
time that the Commonwealth suppressed impeachment evidence by failing to disclose 
that it had reached an agreement with Epps and thereby violated its Brady obligations.    
The District Court concluded that Fisher’s Brady claim was procedurally defaulted 
because Fisher had failed to first raise the claim in state court.  Fisher, ECF Nos. 36 & 41.   
 On appeal, this Court vacated the District Court’s order “insofar as it dismissed 
Fisher’s Brady claim on the ground that he failed to establish cause excusing his 
procedural default.”  Fisher v. Rozum, 441 F. App’x 115, 120 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Fisher I”).  
The Fisher I Court held that Fisher had shown cause because he did not know, nor could 
he have known, facts concerning any alleged understanding between the Commonwealth 
and Epps until May 2007, which was after he could have presented the claim to the state 
court.  Id. at 119-20.   The Court determined that a second PCRA proceeding would have 
been futile because, under Pennsylvania law, Fisher was deemed to know all facts 
available in the public record concerning Epps’s February 1996 guilty plea and his July 
1996 below-guidelines sentence, and a petition at that time based upon such facts would 
have been barred.  Id. at 119.  For these reasons, the Fisher I Court concluded that Fisher 
had shown “cause” for his procedural default and remanded the case with instructions 
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that the District Court examine the “prejudice” prong of the “cause and prejudice” test to 
determine whether to excuse his procedural default.  Id. at 120. 
 On remand, the District Court referred the case to the Magistrate Judge.  The 
Magistrate Judge concluded that this Court found that Epps had an agreement with the 
Commonwealth that was suppressed, and that Fisher therefore suffered prejudice.  
Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that had Fisher known of an agreement he could 
have impeached Epps based on Epps’s interest in benefiting from a deal with the 
Commonwealth and that a reasonable juror could have rejected Epps’s testimony and 
found Fisher not guilty.  For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the 
District Court grant the writ and order Fisher released absent a retrial.   
 The Commonwealth objected, contending that no agreement had been reached and 
offering affidavits from two prosecutors so stating.  Fisher, ECF No. 69-1, 69-2.  The 
District Court stated that “[t]he Commonwealth’s argument that there was no plea 
agreement [with Epps] may be one that the Court of Appeals can consider, but it is not 
open to this Court on remand to ignore or defy the findings made by the Court of 
Appeals.”  App. 4.  The District Court then adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation and conditionally granted the writ, ordering that Fisher be released 
unless the Commonwealth retried him within 180 days.  The Commonwealth appeals.
††
 
                                            
 †† The District Court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and this Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  Our review of the District Court’s legal conclusions is 
plenary and, because the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, our review of the District Court’s 
factual determinations is also plenary.  Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 2004).   
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III 
 The Commonwealth persists in its position that no agreement existed between it 
and Epps.  The Fisher I Court, while not making any factual findings that an agreement 
indeed existed at the time of trial,
‡‡
 did express a view that one may have existed.  These 
sentiments were based in part on the prosecutor’s statement at Epps’s sentencing more 
than four months after Fisher’s trial that the Commonwealth and Epps’s counsel had 
“come to an accord” concerning Epps’ sentence on the November 1994 drug charges.  
Fisher I, 441 F. App’x at 119; App. 71, 202.  Because the panel in Fisher I had evidence 
that suggested some impeachment information may have existed about which Fisher was 
unaware, it held that there was cause to excuse Fisher’s failure to raise this Brady claim 
as part of his PCRA proceedings.  What both the prior panel and this panel lack are any 
details about the nature of any such information and the timing of when it may have come 
into existence.  
   The nature and timing of the information are relevant to both the prejudice prong 
for excusing procedural default and the success of a Brady claim.  Johnson v. Folino, 705 
F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that the materiality element of a Brady claim 
“mirror[s]” the prejudice showing that a petitioner must make to excuse a procedural 
default).  To constitute a Brady violation, the suppressed evidence must be material, 
meaning that the evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
                                            
 ‡‡ Fisher I’s language reflects that it made no findings of fact concerning whether an agreement existed.  
Indeed, it referred to an “alleged deal” and described the record before it as providing “what appear to be” a “highly 
coincidental sequence of events” that indicate that some sort of understanding of leniency existed, including the 
timing of Epps’s guilty plea two weeks before Fisher’s trial and the Commonwealth’s comments at Epps’s 
sentencing four months later that it and Epps had come to an “accord.”  Fisher I, 441 F. App’x at 119.  The timing 
and comment, however, were found sufficient to satisfy the “cause” prong.  
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different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 290 (1999) (quotation marks omitted).  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he 
question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, 
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  To meet his burden, Fisher “must convince [the court] that ‘there 
is a reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial would have been different if the 
suppressed [information] had been disclosed to the defense.”  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.  
“Evidence that tends to impeach prosecution witnesses may be material under this 
standard.”  Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 387.  The proper prejudice inquiry in this case, 
therefore, requires consideration of the nature of the impeachment information, when it 
came into existence, and the strength of the other evidence.  See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. 
at 292-96 (noting that even if the prosecution witness had been “severely impeached,” 
there was “strong support” for the verdict); Johnson, 705 F.3d at 129-30 (observing that 
the district court failed to evaluate “the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence” 
(quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10)).   
 Here, the District Court did not have before it facts concerning the nature or 
timing of the alleged agreement, and thus, the District Court could not properly examine 
its impeachment value.  The District Court simply concluded, without conducting a 
hearing, “that the [plea] agreement that the Commonwealth allegedly suppressed was 
reached in the weeks between Epps’s guilty plea and Epps’s testimony against Fisher.”  
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App. 25.  The record, however, is silent as to whether such an agreement was reached and 
existed at the time of Fisher’s trial or occurred later. 
 Moreover, the District Court ignored the fact that Epps identified Fisher as the 
shooter long before any agreement is alleged to have existed.  On the day of the murder, 
Epps told police he recognized the shooter but did not know his name.  The very next 
day, Epps identified Fisher as the shooter from a photo array.  Furthermore, Epps testified 
at the coroner’s inquest on April 13, 1995— almost a year before he pled guilty to the 
drug charges—about Fisher’s role in the shooting, and his testimony was materially 
consistent with his trial testimony.  Even assuming an agreement was reached before 
trial, Epps could have been rehabilitated by these prior consistent statements.  As a result, 
the timing of the alleged agreement is central to evaluating its impeachment value.  By 
failing to examine this issue, the District Court did not thoroughly consider whether the 
non-disclosure of the alleged agreement could have had any impact on the verdict and 
hence prematurely, and perhaps inappropriately, concluded that there was in fact 
prejudice. 
IV 
 For these reasons, we will vacate the judgment and remand for, in connection with 
the prejudice prong, an inquiry into the nature and timing of any agreement between Epps 
and the Commonwealth, the value of such information in light of Epps’s prior consistent 
statements and other impeachment pursued, and whether there is a reasonable probability 
that the result of Fisher’s trial would have been different if the alleged agreement had 
been disclosed. 
Fisher v. Warden Somerset SCI 
No. 13-3833 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I believe that the law of the case here dictates that an understanding was in place 
between Epps and the Commonwealth; thus, any remand should consider only prejudice 
– not whether or when there was any understanding.  But even if there were no 
understanding, I believe that there was a Brady violation.  For both these reasons,  I 
respectfully dissent.   
In considering whether Fisher should have been told of the status of the charges 
pending against Epps, we all realize that an offender, who is experienced in the criminal 
justice system like Epps, knows full well the benefits that can be cultivated from the 
prosecutors when he cooperates, with or without an agreement, in the resolution of 
another crime  – when he tells the prosecutors what they want to hear, whether or not it is 
true.  When Epps first spoke to police officers at the time of the Hudgins shooting, he 
was well aware of the charges he was facing for drug delivery and theft offenses.  When 
Epps was shown the photo array in the Fisher case, the police were already aware both of 
Epps’s criminal history of 14 arrests and 4 convictions and of the charges pending against 
him.  Both the police and Epps understood at this point how to play the game – whether 
or not there was an explicit understanding.  For that reason, the failure of the prosecution 
to inform Fisher of the status of the charges against Epps constituted a Brady violation 
even absent an explicit deal.   
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As we noted in Fisher v. Rozum, 441 F. App’x 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2011) (Fisher I), 
Epps pled guilty to a number of charges just before Fisher’s trial, with sentencing to 
occur after Epps testified at trial.  After Epps testified, facing a maximum of forty-two 
years imprisonment, the Commonwealth agreed to a below-guideline sentence, stating 
that Epps was a “key witness in a homicide trial,” – i.e., the Fisher trial.  Epps’s defense 
counsel also represented to the court that the prosecutor in the Fisher case had told him 
that, without Epps’s testimony, they would not have achieved a conviction in the Fisher 
case.  
Without the testimony of this key witness, there probably would not have been a 
conviction.  If the jury had known about Epps’s guilty plea and the charges he was 
facing, the jury would have considered these facts in making its credibility determination 
about Epps.  Indeed, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Epps was expecting 
leniency if he testified against Fisher and thus was not credible.  “The materiality 
standard for Brady claims is met when ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken 
to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698 (2004) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 
(1995)).  Because there was no physical evidence that Fisher was the shooter, and as the 
District Court found, Epps was “was the only effective witness the Commonwealth had to 
offer,” the defense suffered materially for being unable to impeach Epps in this way.   
As we observed in United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 303 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006): 
There can be no dispute that the information in question is favorable to the 
defense because [the witness’s] expectation of leniency in the state 
proceedings could have been used to impeach him.  We also believe that 
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there can be no serious dispute regarding materiality . . ..  The question is 
not whether disclosure would have resulted in a different verdict, but 
whether suppression of the evidence “undermine[d] confidence in the 
outcome of the trial.”  
 
 Id. (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-35). Even with no acknowledged deal in place, the 
failure to disclose the guilty plea was prejudicial under Brady.  Moreover, once we have 
determined that there was enough of an “understanding” to establish cause, no other 
information about the nature and timing of the deal is necessary for our prejudice inquiry.  
The inability of the defense to impeach Epps with this testimony undermines my 
confidence in the verdict.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 435.    
The majority, however, focuses on the “nature and timing” of a deal between Epps 
and the Commonwealth, stating that the Fisher I court did not make any factual findings 
as to whether a deal existed at the time of Epps’s testimony.  But then the majority 
contradicts itself by noting that the Fisher I panel found that “some sort of understanding 
of leniency” did in fact exist (citing Fisher I, 441 F. App’x at 119).  The Fisher I panel 
remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to consider only prejudice 
because it had resolved the cause prong.  Therefore, whether the Fisher I panel called it a 
finding of fact or not, and whether the understanding with Epps was formal or not, the 
panel concluded that an understanding existed between Epps and the Commonwealth.  
This is now law of the case. 
I don’t know what the majority hopes to gain on remand.  The majority reasons 
that the “accord” that the Commonwealth and Epps had come to before Epps’s 
sentencing hearing could have occurred in the four months after Fisher’s trial, rather than 
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before it.  The only reason those four months could be relevant is if the majority is 
suggesting that there was no deal, or in fact, no understanding, at the time of Epps’s 
testimony.  But this is precisely the conclusion that is foreclosed by law of the case.  The 
“timing” of the deal that the majority seeks is not relevant to this case.  The potential 
prejudice existed from the time that the police met with Epps with knowledge of Epps’s 
past record and pending charges.  There is no need to remand to consider it. 
Furthermore, eventually acknowledging that some kind of understanding did exist, 
the majority goes on to suggest that there may be no prejudice because Epps could have 
been rehabilitated on the stand by his prior consistent statements.  Perhaps he could have, 
but giving weight to such a claim puts the cart before the horse.  If it matters that Epps 
could have been rehabilitated, then he must have been in need of rehabilitation.  In other 
words, by conceding the need for rehabilitation, the majority implicitly finds that the 
Commonwealth’s omission was prejudicial and, in fact, violated Brady.   
In sum, Fisher was deprived of a powerful opportunity to impeach Epps’s 
testimony.  For this reason, I would affirm the District Court.    
